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Abstract: 
This paper discusses the role of the credit rating agencies during the recent financial crises. In 
particular, it examines whether the agencies can add to the dynamics of emerging market 
crises. Academics and investors often argue that sovereign credit ratings are responsible for 
pronounced boom-bust cycles in emerging markets lending. Using a vector autoregressive 
system this paper examines how US dollar bond yield spreads and the short-term international 
liquidity position react to an unexpected sovereign credit rating change. Contrary to common 
belief and previous studies, the empirical results suggest that an abrupt downgrade does not 
necessarily intensify a financial crisis. 
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I Introduction 
Given the growing relevance of capital markets as a major source of funding for emerging 
market economies, the importance of credit rating agencies in providing standardized 
assessments of credit risks associated with emerging market investments has continued to 
grow. In addition, the recent proposal of the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision of 
June 1999 has emphasized the role of the agencies [Basle Committee on Banking 
Supervision, 1999]. However, not all market participants are confident that credit rating 
agencies are reliable enough to set regulatory capital requirements. 
The sharp adjustments of sovereign credit ratings for many emerging markets during 
the Asian crisis of 1997/98 have raised concerns about the accuracy and stability of the rating 
process [International Monetary Fund, 1999]. Although major credit rating agencies 
accurately identified weaknesses in the financial systems of a number of Asian countries 
before the crisis started in July 1997, the maintenance of investment-grade ratings for many 
countries right up to the brink of the crisis and the subsequent sharp downgrades during the 
Asian crisis were interpreted by many observers as imparting a pro-cyclical element into 
global capital flows. The behavior of the agencies was criticized, because it induced large-
scale capital inflows and excessive compression in interest rate spreads by exacerbating 
herding behavior before the crisis and contributing to the abrupt reversal of capital flows after 
the Asian crisis emerged [International Monetary Fund, 1998]. 
Against the background of these pronounced boom-bust cycles, this paper examines 
empirically whether the agencies can add, i.e. intensify or attenuate, to the dynamics of 
financial crises. By using a vector autoregressive (VAR) model the way US dollar bond yield 
spreads and the short-term international liquidity position react to an unexpected sovereign 
credit rating change is analyzed. Therefore, impulse-response functions are estimated and a 
historical decomposition of the time-paths of the variables is carried out. Previous studies did 
not consider the dynamic interaction between these variables. As will be shown in this paper, 
sovereign credit rating changes clearly have effects on both bond yield spreads and the short-
term international liquidity position. However, variations in bond yield spreads and in the 
short-term international liquidity position also have an effect on sovereign credit ratings. 
Therefore, a multivariate modeling approach seems to be appropriate. 
The empirical results show that abrupt downgrades do not necessarily contribute to 
emerging market crises, which is in sharp contrast to the views of the proponents of the 
boom-bust cycles theory. For the agencies’ rating actions during boom-bust cycles this result  
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implies three important consequences. First, contrary to common belief and previous studies, 
a sharp downgrade does not necessarily intensify a financial crisis. Moreover, it can help to 
end the financial market turmoil more quickly. Second, a cautious, gradual downgrading of 
the sovereign credit rating can intensify the financial crisis. And third, if credit rating agencies 
act with foresight, an initial downgrade will not cause a bust-phase and an initial upgrade will 
not cause a boom-phase. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives an overview on the 
topic of sovereign risk and credit rating agencies. The first part describes the role of the 
agencies in international financial markets, while the second part discusses the criteria and the 
third part the methodology of sovereign credit ratings. Section 3 analyzes in an empirical 
study whether credit rating agencies may add to the dynamics of emerging market crises. To 
motivate this question, the first part considers the role of the agencies during the Asian crisis 
1997/98 and tries to answer whether agencies failed during the financial market turmoil. The 
second part of section 3 discusses the recent empirical investigations by Cantor and Packer, 
and Reisen and von Maltzan [Cantor, 1996; Reisen, 1999]. Part 3 describes the data and 
methodology used in the empirical study, while the last part of section 3 presents the results. 
Section 4 concludes. 
 
II  Sovereign Risk and Credit Rating Agencies 
During the 1990s, global securities markets have become an increasingly important source of 
funding for many emerging market countries. In this respect, credit rating agencies, such as 
Standard & Poor’s (S&P) and Moody’s Investors Service (Moody’s), have been seen by many 
market participants as having a strong impact on both the costs of funding and the willingness 
of major institutional investors to hold certain types of instruments. Indeed, obtaining a 
sovereign credit rating has often been seen as a prerequisite for issuing a Eurobond. 
Furthermore, some institutional investors are constrained to hold securities that have been 
classified by the agencies as investment-grade, as a result of either official regulations or 
internal risk management practices. Moreover, sovereign credit ratings often serve as a ceiling 
for private sector ratings of any given country, which stretches their influence far beyond 
government securities [Moody’s, 1999].  
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II.1  Sovereign Credit Rating Criteria 
Like other credit ratings, sovereign ratings are assessments of the likelihood that a borrower 
will default on his obligations. The rating agencies interpret their ratings as forward-looking 
indications of the relative risk that debt issuers will not have the ability and willingness to 
make full and timely payments of principal and interest over the life of particular rated 
instruments [Standard & Poor’s, 1998].  Although credit ratings are inevitably influenced by 
cyclical factors, agency officials point out that long-term foreign currency debt ratings try to 
see through economic, political, credit, and commodity cycles. Therefore, a recession or 
tightening of global liquidity should not, by itself, be the reason for a sovereign downgrade. 
Rating changes should thus be tied to fundamental factors such as secular trends [Standard & 
Poor’s, 1998]. 
The two major credit rating agencies, Moody’s and S&P, which cover approximately 
80 percent of all sovereign ratings, argue that they do not regard their ratings as providing 
either a prediction of the timing of default or an indication of the absolute level of risk 
associated with a particular obligation [Moody’s Investor Service, 1999; Standard & Poor’s, 
1999b]. Moreover, the agencies declare that an issuer credit rating is not a recommendation to 
purchase, sell, or hold a financial obligation issued by an obligor, as it does not comment on 
market price or suitability for a particular investor. 
In assessing the solvency and liquidity of sovereigns, rating agencies have focused on a 
number of factors. S&P, for instance, divides the factors which influence the determination of 
the overall sovereign rating into eight broad categories: Political risk, income and economic 
structure, economic growth prospects, fiscal flexibility, public debt burden, price stability, 
balance of payments flexibility, and external debt and liquidity. Each category relates to the 
two key aspects of credit risk, i.e. economic and political risk. Economic risk addresses the 
government’s ability to repay its obligations on time and is a function of both quantitative and 
qualitative factors, while political risk addresses the sovereign’s willingness to repay debt. 
 
II.2  Sovereign Credit Rating Methodology 
Despite the fact that all major credit rating agencies list the relevant economic and political 
factors that underlie their sovereign ratings, they supply no information about the weights 
they assign to each factor and the role of non-quantifiable criteria such as government 
stability and policy consensus. The rating agencies emphasize that they do not use a specific  
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formula to combine their evaluations of the political and economic factors to derive the 
overall rating. However, there have been a number of empirical studies which attempt to shed 
light on the quantitative factors having historically received the greatest weights in the 
decision-making process [Cantor, 1996; Juttner, 2000]. 
For their ratings the agencies use an ordinary scale. S&P’s rating run from AAA, the 
highest, through AA, A, and BBB, which is still investment-grade, and then all the way down 
to D, which reflects the potential default of an obligation. Similarly, Moody’s ratings range 
from Aaa through Baa down to Caa. Ratings are also subject to refinements by adding pluses 
or minuses or additional numbers. Sovereign credit ratings are often divided into two broad 
categories: investment-grade and speculative-grade. Investment-grade issues are usually 
considered to be acceptable investments for institutional investors. S&P’s issues rated BBB- 
and above are investment-grade, while Moody’s split is made at Baa3 and above.  
In recent years, both S&P and Moody’s have supplemented their sovereign credit 
ratings with outlooks and watches, respectively, designed to indicate the agencies’ perspective 
on factors that might prompt a rating review over the next six to 24 months. Such reviews are 
denoted as positive, implying that the rating may be raised, stable, or negative, implying that 
the rating may be lowered. However, as S&P points out, an outlook is not necessarily a 
precursor of a rating change [Standard & Poor’s, 2000].
1 
 
III  Do Credit Rating Agencies Add to the Dynamics of  
Emerging Market Crises? 
An interesting question is whether credit rating agencies can add, i.e. intensify or attenuate, to 
the dynamics of financial crises in emerging markets. A necessary condition for this to occur 
is the existence of causality from sovereign credit ratings to yield spreads. Reisen and von 
Maltzan argue that sovereign ratings might be able to trigger pronounced boom-bust-cycles in 
emerging market lending [Reisen, 1999]. This means that initially small capital outflows from 
an emerging market and subsequently widening spreads lead rating agencies to downgrade the 
country in question. This, in turn, is interpreted by many investors as a signal to withdraw 
additional capital. As a result, the spreads become even larger and the agencies continue to 
                                                 
1   S&P indicates that roughly two-thirds of all rating’s outlooks for the 83 sovereigns it rates as of December 
31, 1999, result in a rating change. Since rating outlooks were created in 1989, most sovereign ratings with a 
positive outlook were upgraded at the next rating change. Up to now, sovereigns with a positive outlook have 
never been downgraded at the next rating change.  
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downgrade. Following this argumentation, this represents a vicious circle that can trigger a 
financial crisis at the slightest provocation. 
The proponents of this boom-bust cycle theory argue that the upgrading of the Asian 
countries in the mid-1990s already proved the existence of a vicious circle, though in the 
opposite direction. This means that capital inflows led to higher ratings which, in turn, 
triggered more capital inflows [Reisen, 1999]. To motivate the question, whether credit rating 
agencies can add to the dynamics of emerging market crises, the following part discusses the 
role of the agencies during the Asian crisis of 1997/98. 
 
III.1  The Role of Credit Rating Agencies during the  
Asian Crisis of 1997-98 
The rating changes on Asian emerging markets observed during the period between July 1997 
and November 1998 were, collectively, the largest and most abrupt downgrades in the modern 
history of sovereign credit ratings. Across all agencies, so-called rating crises, which denote a 
downgrade of three rating notches or more in long-term foreign currency debt, were observed. 
Table 1 lists the changes of S&P’s credit ratings for the most crisis-ridden countries during 
the Asian crisis of 1997-98. 
Table 1:  Changes of Standard &Poor’s Sovereign Credit Ratings during the Asian Crisis 
Country  July 1, 1997  November 30, 1998 
Indonesia BBB  CCC+ 
South Korea  AA-  BB+ 
Malaysia A+  BBB- 
Thailand A  BBB- 
 
Table 1 indicates that Indonesia and South Korea fell both by eight rating notches, 
while Malaysia fell by five and Thailand by four rating notches. It is important to note that 
during the course of these negative sovereign rating actions, Moody’s downgraded Indonesia, 
South Korea and Thailand to non-investment-grade, whereas S&P reduced Indonesia and 
South Korea to speculative-grade, but assigned the lowest possible investment-grade rating to 
Malaysia and Thailand. 
Market participants raised criticisms that the credit rating agencies were not only lax in 
foreseeing the vulnerabilities of the East-Asian countries that eventually succumbed to crisis,  
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but that they have also responded to negative developments too slowly. This means that they 
were downgrading the debtor countries only after the onset of the crisis, thereby exacerbating 
market price movements and increasing instability [International Monetary Fund, 1998]. 
Following the Asian crisis, a number of weaknesses in the determination of sovereign credit 
ratings became obvious. For example, the International Monetary Fund criticized the lack of 
statistical methodology and the need for significant improvements in risk assessments 
techniques such as extensive scenario analysis, sensitivity analysis and stress testing 
[International Monetary Fund, 1999]. 
However, market analysts and asset prices provided little warning of the impending 
Asian crisis. The market, as gauged by sovereign debt yields, broadly shares the relative 
rankings of sovereign credit risks made by the agencies. Spreads had not widened 
considerably in the Asian countries by the onset of the crisis [Kaminsky, 1999]. As with 
ratings the bulk of the deterioration was observed later [Eichengreen, 1998]. Moreover, the 
market analysts’ surveys, published by the Institutional Investor and Euromoney just prior to 
the crisis indicated, that these analysts gave high creditworthiness ratings to all the Asian 
countries receiving investment-grade ratings by Moody’s and S&P.  
Table 2:  Market Ratings of Asian Crisis Countries by Institutional Investor (II) and 
Euromoney (EM), (Scores out of 100) 
Country  II 09/96  II 09/98  EM 09/96  EM 09/98 
Thailand  63 48 80 49 
Indonesia  72 54 88 56 
South  Korea  52 33 73 34 
 
As Table 2 shows, the rating scores by Institutional Investor and Euromoney were 
lowered substantially after the Asian crisis.  
Whether the credit rating agencies failed during the Asian crisis is another question, 
since the declared purpose of sovereign credit ratings is to indicate the likelihood of default 
and not to predict spreads of emerging market bonds. The largest rating downgrades typically 
occurred following the revelation of what the agencies regarded as new information with 
significant impact on the short-term international liquidity position of the rated sovereign. 
Moody’s [Moody’s Investor Service, 1998], for example, argues that its major rating reviews 
had been triggered by 
•  the reports on the size of the Bank of Thailand’s forward foreign exchange position,  
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•  the extent of the Bank of Korea’s placement of its foreign exchange reserves in 
offshore South Korean banks, implying that these funds were not liquid, and 
•  the emergence of widespread political disturbances in Indonesia. 
By sharply downgrading the East-Asian countries, the agencies merely considered the 
likelihood of default for these countries to be higher than before the crisis. This argumentation 
seems plausible, since the Asian crisis certainly did not have a positive effect on the ability 
and in particular the willingness of the affected countries to service their debt in full and on 
time. The sovereign ratings assigned by the agencies only reacted to the unpredictable 
developments which certainly influence the risk of sovereign default in general. Of course, 
this is exactly what credit rating agencies are supposed to do. 
 
III.2  Recent Empirical Studies 
In examining the relationship between changes in the sovereign credit ratings assigned by the 
agencies and the changes in the spread between the yields on US dollar-denominated 
Eurobonds and comparable US treasury bonds, somewhat mixed results where obtained by a 
number of empirical studies which tried to shed light on this issue using event studies and 
Granger causality tests. 
Cantor and Packer studied the effect of rating announcements, i.e. of both S&P’s 
outlooks and Moody’s credit watches, and implemented sovereign ratings on spreads, i.e. the 
differential between yields on US dollar-denominated Eurobonds and on comparable five-
year US treasury bonds [Cantor, 1996]. In their empirical analysis they used daily data from 
the periods before and after the 79 rating announcements covered by their 35 country sample 
and concluded that 
•  the impact of rating announcements on spreads was much stronger for speculative-
grade than for investment-grade rated sovereigns, and 
•  the announcements of possible upgrades in the agencies’ sovereign ratings were 
followed by statistically significant bond yield movements in the expected direction, 
i.e., a decline in yield spreads, but announcements of possible downgrades did not 
produce significant effects. 
Reisen and von Maltzan, using data on 29 sovereigns from 1989 to 1997 and 152 
sovereign credit rating announcements, of which 97 events affected emerging market  
8 
 
countries, conducted their studies in two parts. First, they examined the interaction between 
spreads on sovereign bonds, namely the differential between yields on US dollar-denominated 
sovereign bonds and yields on ten-year US treasury bonds, and implemented sovereign credit 
ratings by S&P and Moody’s [Reisen, 1999]. In particular, they considered whether ratings 
Granger-caused sovereign interest spreads after controlling for macroeconomic indicators. 
These latter variables included the total stock market return, foreign exchange reserves, the 
real exchange rate, the terms of trade, and industrial production. The authors concluded that 
agencies’ sovereign credit ratings Granger-cause yield spreads and vice versa. 
Reisen and von Maltzan also undertook an event study similar to the one by Cantor and 
Packer [Reisen, 1999; Cantor, 1996]. They also found that the largest announcement effects 
are observed for emerging market sovereign spreads. However, in sharp contrast to the results 
of Cantor and Packer, they found that a significant change in the yield spread in the expected 
direction occurred during the announcement period of 30 days before and after the rating 
event only when a possible downgrade was implemented. Reisen and von Maltzan argue that, 
in principle, sovereign credit ratings might be able to help to attenuate boom-bust cycles in 
emerging market lending. During the boom, early rating downgrades would help to dampen 
euphoric expectations and reduce private short-term capital flows which have repeatedly seen 
to fuel credit booms and financial vulnerability in the capital importing countries.  
 
III.3 Data  and  Methodology 
The sample used in this paper consists of 20 countries and in essence that of Sachs, Tornell 
and Velasco, which is a geographically balanced sample [Sachs, 1996]. It includes all 
emerging market economies which had a share in emerging market lending of over one 
percent as of June 1999: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Hungary, India, Indonesia, 
Jordan, South Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Russia, South 
Africa, Thailand, Turkey, and Venezuela.
2 This study considers the period from June 1, 1992 
to February 1, 2000, and is therefore fully capturing the financial market turmoil in the 1990s: 
the Mexican Peso crisis 1994/95, the Asian crisis 1997/98, the Russian crisis in mid-1998, 
and the Brazil currency crisis in early 1999. 
                                                 
2   Two countries, China and Taiwan Province of China, are excluded here from the original Sachs, Tornell, 
Velasco sample, because its data are not included in the International Monetary Fund’s International 
Financial Statistics database.  
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The sample consists of monthly averages of daily sovereign credit ratings of long-term 
foreign currency debt which have been assigned by S&P and Moody’s. The rating history has 
been directly obtained from these two market leaders. Although the two agencies use different 
symbols in assessing credit risk, every S&P rating scale has its counterpart in Moody’s rating 
scale. This correspondence permits a linear transformation into numbers. As Table 3 in the 
Appendix shows, this linear scale implies that differences of ratings correspond one to one 
with differences in perceptions of country risk.
3 In order to consider not only the implemented 
long-term foreign currency debt ratings but also the imminent rating changes, the numerical 
scale of the transformed sovereign credit ratings also contain outlooks and watches, 
respectively.
4 
The International Monetary Fund argues that two variables play a crucial role during 
financial crises: the yield spread between a country’s Eurobonds and comparable US treasury 
bonds, and the short-term international liquidity position, i.e. total international reserves 
minus total short-term debt. Previous studies have shown that these two variables can explain 
nearly 80 percent of variation in sovereign credit ratings [International Monetary Fund, 1999]. 
Therefore, the second type of data needed for this analysis are the movements in relative US 
dollar bond yield spreads, i.e. the spreads between a country’s Eurobonds and comparable US 
treasury bonds. Since they are not subject to currency risk, dollar bond spreads can be 
assumed to primarily reflect country risk premia on government Eurobonds of the same 
maturity [Jarrow, 1998]. The risk-free benchmark for the computation of spreads is the ten-
year US Treasury bond. 
The construction of a reliable and comparable dataset on spreads is not easy, given the 
low liquidity of some of the bonds and the wide difference of characteristics of the bonds. 
Following Monford and Mulder, this analysis uses the most actively traded Eurobonds, which 
are maturing between 2001 and 2003, and additional information on Brady bonds to capture 
the month-to-month market movements in case of missing data. When no sovereign bonds are 
available for a long enough period, the spreads are proxied by a relatively risk free corporate 
bond, issued for example by a public sector company or a local development bank [Monford, 
                                                 
3   Two alternative transformation forms can be considered instead of the linear transformation: the logistic 
transformation and a kinked function with a structural break. Such a transformation implies the hypothesis 
that risk perceptions first deteriorate slowly as rating notches decrease, then deteriorate faster when credit 
ratings fall from investment-grade to speculative-grade, and finally deteriorate slowly again as ratings reach 
the bottom of the classification. Another alternative transformation form could be a kinked function with a 
structural break when the sovereign bond passes from investment-grade to speculative-grade. 
4   This is realized by adding 0.3 of one rating notch for a positive outlook by S&P or a positive credit watch by 
Moody’s and –0.3 of one rating notch for a negative outlook or credit watch, respectively, to the 
implemented sovereign credit rating in question.  
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2000]. Further details on the bonds used are given in Table 4 in the Appendix. The data are 
obtained on a monthly basis from Bloomberg L.P. This analysis uses monthly averages rather 
than a single observation at the beginning, middle or end of the period, given the high 
volatility of spreads and also sometimes the lack of data of the entire month. The relative 
yield spread is then calculated as a fraction of the benchmark yield on central government 
bonds, based on data obtained on fixed-rate dollar bond redemption yields. 
The third necessary dataset used in this empirical study is the short-term international 
liquidity position, given by the value of total international reserves (including gold at market 
prices) at month-end minus total short-term debt at month end. Both variables were extracted 
on a monthly basis from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics. If the data were not 
available from the IFS, the dataset was eventually complemented by data from the OECD’s 
World Economic Outlook or the publications of the Bank for International Settlements. 
If the boom-bust cycles theory holds, the short-term international liquidity position and 
the spreads between a country’s Eurobonds and US treasury bonds depend on the sovereign 
credit rating assigned by the credit rating agencies. However, in order to examine the question 
of whether sovereign downgrades contribute to financial crises, only the influence of 
unexpected rating changes should be measured, since only these should be able to trigger 
market reactions. In other words: If all market participants expect a sovereign credit rating 
change, then the latter should have no longer any impact. Previous studies did not take into 
account the dynamic interaction between the three variables captured in this analysis. Clearly, 
sovereign credit rating changes have effects on both bond yield spreads and the international 
liquidity position. However, bond yield spreads and the international liquidity position also 
have effects on sovereign credit ratings. Therefore a multivariate modeling approach seems 
appropriate.  
A good way to measure the dynamic interaction between these three variables is the 
specification of a vector autoregressive (VAR) system. As its name implies, this method 
consists of regressing each current variable in the model lagged a certain number of times. 
The VAR approach provides a simple tool for characterizing the dynamic interaction of the 
data, which in turn can be displayed by their impulse response functions. A useful tool to 
examine the impact of an unexpected rating change on spreads and the international liquidity 
position, respectively, are simulations of the VAR system via a historical decomposition of 
the time-paths of the variables into a base projection and the accumulated effects of current 
and past innovations. The intuition behind this decomposition is a breakdown of the observed  
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fluctuations of the variables at a time t into a part which was expected at time t-1 and shocks 
that occurred at time t. In other words, the historical decomposition tries to answer the 
question of which shock caused the variable to fluctuate. 
 
III.4   Empirical  Results 
In addition to the determination of the set of variables that is used in the VAR system it is 
important to determine the appropriate lag length. The multivariate generalization of the 
Akaike information criterion indicates that three lags are appropriate. Therefore, the resulting 
third-order VAR system describing the interaction between the three variables, notably, the 
sovereign credit rating rt, the spread st, and the short-term international liquidity position lt is 
given through  
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After estimating the intercepts and the coefficients of each equation of the VAR system 
by using ordinary least squares (OLS), the three variables examined at time t can be divided 
into a predictable and an unpredictable part. The predictable part is modeled on the basis of 
the past values of each variable, while the unpredictable part is given by the error terms. 
Given the information at t-1, the time-path of the spreads, i.e., st, st+1, …, st+n, and the time-
path of the short-term international liquidity position, i.e., lt,  lt+1, …, lt+n, can then be 
attributed to the three following factors: 
1.  the initial situation, i.e., the predictable part, based on the information available at t-1 
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2.  the unexpected rating changes 
  1 , ,...,   , rt rt rt n uu u ++  
3.  and the remaining factors of the unpredictable part 
  1 , ,..., st st st n uu u ++  
 and 
  1 , ,...,   . lt lt lt n uu u ++  
The primary interest lies in the influence of the second factor since it measures the 
effect of unexpected sovereign credit rating changes by the agencies on the spread and on the 
short-term international liquidity position, respectively. To examine the issue of whether the 
boom-bust cycles theory holds, the VAR system can be used for estimations of the impulse-
response-functions. 
Moreover, the estimation of the impulse-response-functions is an important tool to 
check the robustness of the underlying VAR model. Confidence intervals, i.e. error bands, for 
the 90 percent and for the 95 percent level were drawn out and showed that the results are 
robust. For the individual variables, the impulse-response-functions show the expected signs 
after an unexpected sovereign rating shock which go in line with the theory and the empirical 
analysis of previous studies [Cantor, 1996; Reisen, 1999; Monford, 2000]: Positive sovereign 
credit rating changes should be associated with negative changes in the yield spreads and a 
positive impact on the short-term international liquidity positions. 
A historical decomposition can be made by a two-step procedure to analyze the time-
paths of the variables. In a first step, it is assumed that there will be no unanticipated rating 
changes in the future, i.e., ut = 0, ∀ t = 1, …, n. Using the VAR system a forecast for the time-
paths of the spreads and the short-term international liquidity position can be done. These 
forecasts give the expected developments of the variables st and lt, i.e.  1,..., tt n ss ++   and 
1,..., tt n ll ++  . 
In a second step one should measure how the entire time-paths of the spreads and the 
short-term international liquidity position are affected by a stochastic shock. Therefore, the 
VAR system can be used for forecasting based on the assumption that unanticipated news at  
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time t causes the downgrading of the sovereign credit rating. The values of the variables st and 
lt, if the variable rt is shocked by a change of a one-unit standard deviation in period t, are 
then given as  1,..., tt n ss ++  and  1,..., tt n ll ++ . The difference between these first and second step 
forecasts of the VAR system reflects the influence of an unanticipated sovereign credit rating 
shock at time t on the time-paths of the spreads and the short-term international liquidity 
position in t+1, …, t+n. 
In the following the role of an unexpected sovereign credit rating downgrade in an 
emerging market crisis is explicitly analyzed for two cases: Mexico during the Mexican Peso 
crisis of 1994/95 and South Korea during the Asian crisis of 1997/98. The selection criteria 
for these two countries are that both countries suffered major financial crises during the 
financial market turmoil of the 1990s, both countries were newly assigned members of the 
OECD, especially after the Mexican and Asian currency financial crises, the correctness, 
timeliness and impact of sovereign credit ratings assigned by the agencies have been intensely 
debated in the literature, and Mexico is the common empirical example for a second-
generation currency crises model, while South Korea is the common example for a country 
which suffered a so-called third-generation currency crisis [Juttner, 2000]. 
To show the different impacts of an unexpected rating change on the time-paths of the 
spreads and the international liquidity position, the initial sovereign credit rating was shocked 
by an one-unit standard deviation for different starting points prior to the two financial crises 
and for different number of months over which the historical decomposition was created. 
Finally, in the case of Mexico a starting point seven months prior to the onset of the Mexican 
Peso crisis of late December 1994/ early January 1995, i.e. June 1994, was chosen. For South 
Korea, the starting point of the historical decomposition is March 1997, i.e. seven months 
before the Asian crisis sharply affected South Korea in October 1997. In both cases the 
forecast horizon of the historical decomposition is 24 months. The simulation results of the 
historical decomposition showed that there were no significant differences in the long-term 
foreign currency debt ratings assigned by S&P and Moody’s. Therefore, the variable rt used in 
the analysis is the average of the sovereign credit ratings assigned by these two agencies. 
Figure 1 shows the impact of a downgrade of the Mexican long-term foreign currency 
debt rating by an one-unit standard deviation shock on the spread of the Mexican Eurobond 
(United Mexican States, Maturity: 09/01/2002).   
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Figure 1:  Historical Decomposition of the Time-Path of Spreads of Mexican Eurobonds (in 
basis points) 
 
The solid line shows the effective time-paths of the spread of the Mexican Eurobond 
for the period between the beginning of June 1994 and the end of May 1996. The upper 
dashed line shows the expected time-path of the spread in mid-1994, while the lower dashed 
line shows the impact of the unexpected downgrade of the sovereign. Both dashed lines 
calculated on the basis of the specified three-variable VAR(3) system approximately add-up 
to the observed behavior of the spread of the Mexican Eurobond during the period between 
June 1994 and May 1996 (see also Table 5 in the Appendix). 
The empirical results suggest that a large part of the widening of the spread observed in 
early 1995 was due to negative sovereign credit rating changes. The fact that Mexico was not 
only put on the so-called credit watch list by S&P with a negative outlook on December 23, 
1994, but was also downgraded from BB+ to BB on February 10, 1995, and was assigned a 
further negative outlook on March 23, 1995, evidently worsened the Mexican Peso crisis. 
This result is in line with the conclusion drawn by Reisen and von Maltzan that agencies’ 
sovereign credit ratings Granger-cause yield spreads and contribute to the dynamics of 
financial crises, i.e., that during a bust-phase a downgrade of the initial sovereign credit rating 
intensify the emerging market crisis. 
However, this is not true for all emerging market crises. Figure 2 illustrates the impact 
of an one-unit standard deviation downgrade of the South Korean long-term foreign currency 
debt rating on the short-term international liquidity position given by the value of total 
international reserves minus total short-term debt of South Korea.   
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Figure 2:  Historical Decomposition of the Time-Path of South Korea’s Short-Term 
International Liquidity Position (in billion US dollar) 
 
The solid line shows the effective time-path of the South Korean international liquidity 
position for the period between the beginning of March 1997 and the end of February 1999. 
The upper dashed line shows the expected development in early 1997, while the lower dashed 
line shows the impact of the unexpected sovereign credit rating downgrade on the South 
Korean short-term international liquidity position. 
It is important to notice that South Korea faced during the Asian crisis of 1997/98 the 
largest and sharpest downgrading in the history of sovereign credit ratings. For example, S&P 
downgraded South Korea on October 24, 1997, from AA- to A+, on November 25, 1997, to 
A-, on December 1, 1997, to BBB-, and assigned South Korea on December 22, 1997, a 
speculative-grade sovereign credit rating. Overall, the negative sovereign rating actions on the 
South Korean long-term foreign currency debt rating summed up to 8.3 rating notches in only 
two months. 
However, as Figure 2 and Table 6 in the Appendix indicate, these sharp sovereign 
credit ratings downgrading appeared to have little impact on the South Korean short-term 
international liquidity position. Moreover, from mid-January 1998, South Korea’s sovereign 
credit rating was gradually upgraded again [Berg, 1999]. For example, S&P revealed the 
negative outlook on January, 16, 1998, and assigned South Korea an investment-grade long-
term foreign currency debt rating. The empirical results show that this improved South 
Korea’s short-term international liquidity position. Therefore, in contrast to the results by 
Reisen and von Maltzan, during a bust-phase in emerging-markets lending a negative  
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sovereign credit rating downgrade or announcement does not necessarily intensify a financial 
crisis. 
As a proof of the boom-bust cycles theory, its proponents cite studies that provide 
evidence that first, sovereign credit ratings are influenced by capital movements and changes 
in the yield spreads, and second, that capital flows and spreads react to sovereign credit rating 
changes [Cantor, 1996; Reisen, 1999]. The question is whether such a pattern really exists 
which could in turn be strategically used by institutional investors. If credit rating agencies 
know that their rating changes trigger market reactions, they can react accordingly. Hence, 
instead of setting off a bust-phase by a small initial downgrade, a farsighted credit rating 
agency would anticipate the subsequent market reactions by opting for one large downgrade. 
The following market reactions would then no longer lead to renewed downgrades. 
 
IV Conclusion  and  Outlook 
Academics and investors often argue that sovereign credit rating downgrades contribute to the 
dynamics of financial crises during a bust-phase in emerging-markets lending. Initially small 
capital outflows and subsequently widening spreads lead rating agencies to downgrade the 
sovereign. This, in turn, leads many investors to withdraw additional capital. As a result, the 
spreads become even larger, the agencies continue to downgrade the sovereign, and intensify 
by their rating actions the financial crisis. Considering this so-called boom-bust cycles theory 
this paper tried to shed light on the role of credit rating agencies during the financial turmoil 
of the 1990s. In particular it analyzes the impact of the sovereign credit rating downgrades 
during emerging market crises for the cases of Mexico during the Mexican Peso crisis of 
1994/95 and for South Korea during the Asian crisis of 1997-98.  
By using a vector-autoregressive model approach, the empirical results suggest that 
sovereign credit rating downgrades do not necessarily intensify financial crises during a bust-
phase. In the case of Mexico, a large part of the widening of the yield spreads observed in 
early 1995 was indeed due to the negative change of the sovereign credit rating by an average 
of one rating notch. However, in contrast to previous studies, in the case of South Korea, the 
sharp sovereign credit rating downgrading by an average of eight rating notches had little 
impact on the South Korean short-term international liquidity position. 
For the agencies’ rating actions during boom-bust cycles in emerging-markets lending 
these results imply three important consequences. First, contrary to common belief, a sharp  
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downgrade as in the case of South Korea during the Asian crisis of 1997-98 does not 
necessarily intensify a financial crisis. Moreover, it can help to end the financial crisis more 
quickly. Second, a cautious, gradual downgrading as in the case of Mexico during the 
Mexican Peso crisis of 1994/95 can intensify the financial crisis. And third, if credit rating 
agencies act with foresight, an initial downgrade will not cause a bust-phase and an initial 
upgrade will not cause a boom-phase in emerging-markets lending, and therefore cannot be 
strategically used by institutional investors. 
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Appendix 
 
Table 3:  Linear Transformation of S&P’s and Moody’s Ordinal Rating Scales into a 
Numerical Scale 
S&P Moody’s Scale 
AAA Aaa  20 
AA+ Aa1  19 
AA Aa2  18 
AA- Aa3  17 
A+ A1  16 
A A2  15 
A- A3  14 
BBB+ Baa1  13 
BBB Baa2  12 
BBB- Baa3  11 
BB+ Ba1  10 
BB Ba2  9 
BB- Ba3  8 
B+ B1  7 
B B2  6 
B- B3  5 
CCC+ Caa1  4 
CCC Caa2  3 
CCC- Caa3  2 
CC Ca  1 
D C  0 
  
21 
 
Table 4:  Sovereign Bonds Used in the Analysis 
Country Bond  Used  Maturity 
Argentina  Republic of Argentina  12/01/2003 
Brazil  Republic of Brazil   11/01/2001 
Chile  Companía Teléfono Chile  07/01/2007 
Colombia  Republic of Colombia  02/01/2003 
Hungary  National Bank of Hungary  04/01/2003 
India ICICI  04/01/2000 
Indonesia Republic  of  Indonesia  08/01/2006 
Jordan  Kingdom of Jordan (Brady bond)  12/01/2023 
South Korea  Korean Development Bank  05/01/2000 
Malaysia Malaysia  09/01/2000 
Mexico  United Mexican States  09/01/2002 
Pakistan  Republic of Pakistan  02/01/2002 
Peru  Republic of Peru (Brady bond)  03/01/2017 
Philippines  National Power Corporation  11/01/2000 
Poland Poland  07/01/2000 
Russia  Ministry of Finance  11/01/2001 
South Africa  Republic of South Africa  12/01/1999 
Thailand  Kingdom of Thailand  03/01/2002 
Turkey  Republic of Turkey  05/01/2002 
Venezuela  Republic of Venezuela  12/01/2003 
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Table 5:  Empirical Results of the Historical Decomposition of the Time-Path of the 
Spreads of Mexican Brady Bonds (in bp) 
Date  Effective  Expected  Impact of Downgrade 
06/1994 507.090  553.790  -41.954 
07/1994 534.700  615.465  -107.477 
08/1994 443.608  620.972  -135.643 
09/1994 437.904  652.333  -159.861 
10/1994 457.100  672.339  -157.459 
11/1994 454.650  689.957  -169.727 
12/1994 596.904  703.143  107.977 
01/1995 1,065.050  713.334  371.776 
02/1995 1,280.315  720.997  380.604 
03/1995 1,912.304  726.538  679.506 
04/1995 1,356.684  730.334  495.668 
05/1995 1,137.636  732.692  266.202 
06/1995 1,194.363  733.884  272.623 
07/1995 964.050  734.134  230.851 
08/1995 975.739  733.633  192.786 
09/1995 1,032.350  732.542  187.726 
10/1995 1,204.952  730.995  138.453 
11/1995 1,336.809  729.106  59.322 
12/1995 1,193.750  726.970  -28.597 
01/1996 924.095  724.665  -72.486 
02/1996 905.250  722.258  -45.794 
03/1996 940.142  719.802  -11.163 
04/1996 784.333  717.341  -13.467 
05/1996 743.318  714.911  -7.521 
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Table 6:  Empirical Results of the Historical Decomposition of the Time-Path of South 
Korea’s International Liquidity Position (in billion US dollar) 
Date  Effective  Expected  Impact of Downgrade 
03/1997 18.616 19.448  0.256 
04/1997 18.549 19.716  0.528 
05/1997 19.756 19.861  0.851 
06/1997 23.286 20.259  0.761 
07/1997 24.550 20.765  0.290 
08/1997 22.206 21.112  -0.372 
09/1997 20.197 21.363  -0.576 
10/1997 16.824 21.646  -1.199 
11/1997 9.032  21.956  -1.904 
12/1997 10.812 22.259  -6.324 
01/1998 14.371 22.561  -7.218 
02/1998 16.474 22.876  -6.981 
03/1998 28.111 23.197  -1.588 
04/1998 34.560 23.515  2.308 
05/1998 35.137 23.832  1.582 
06/1998 32.959 24.151  1.783 
07/1998 43.691 24.468  2.983 
08/1998 22.421 24.784  4.132 
09/1998 19.504 25.097  6.526 
10/1998 22.945 25.408  8.730 
11/1998 26.966 25.717  11.328 
12/1998 23.267 26.022  12.379 
01/1999 28.360 26.323  12.951 
02/1999 31.603 26.621  13.017 
 